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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
G. DAYTON HUGHES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
RICHARD D. HOOPER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
10700 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages 
against the defendant for personal injuries and prop-
erty damage arising from an automobile collision which 
occurred at an open intersection in the City of Provo, 
Utah on the 7th day of June, 1963, at approximately 
9 :00 o'clock a.m. Plaintiff appeals to this Court from 
a jury verdict of no cause of action predicated upon 
its finding that plaintiff was contributorily negligent, 
and that such contributory negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident and plaintiff's injuries. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The collision hereinafter described occurred at the 
intersection of 100 South Street and 600 West Street 
' Provo, Utah, which is an open intersection, i.e., there 
was no regulatory traffic signs or lights controlling. 
The city ordinances of Provo City established the maxi-
mum speed at 25 miles per hour (R. 32, 70). 
Plaintiff commenced driving his automobile short-
ly before the accident, having placed his car into opera-
tion between 2nd and 3rd South Street, proceeding 
northerly on 6th West, passing through the intersection 
at 2nd South (R. 73). Plaintiff drove his automobile 
along its course on 6th West at an approximate speed 
of 20-25 miles per hour (R. 12, 137). When he ap-
proached the intersection of 100 South Street and 609 
West Street, he slowed his speed to approximately 15 
miles per hour (R. 151), and as he entered the subject 
intersection he shifted his vehicle from high gear to 
second gear. Plaintiff, as he approached the intersection 
of 1st South Street, looked to see whether the intersec-
tion was clear (R. 73, 138). To his left, parked along the 
southerly side of 100 South Street, were several closely 
parked vehicles (R. 138) which obstructed his view. 
Defendant had no definite recollection of the parked 
vehicles (R. 181) but acknowledged he could have seen 
plaintiff's vehicle 150 feet from the intersection (R. 
180). He first saw plaintiff's vehicle when he was ap-
proximately at the crosswalk to the intersection and 
when plaintiff was approximately at the crosswalk to 
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the intersection ( R. 179, see P. Ex. 6, where defendant 
drew squares representing his vehicle and plaintiff's 
vehicle with red crayon). 
Plaintiff entered the intersection first (R. 21, 57; 
see P. Ex. 6). Exhibit 6, which is reproduced herein, 
clearly demonstrated that plaintiff entered the inter-
section first. Mr. Arnold Coon, engineer, testified that 
from the investigative report and testimony of Officer 
Baum, and from the physical measurements he made at 
the intersection assuming that plaintiff was traveling 
at a constant speed of 20 miles per hour (the highest 
rate of speed attributable to plaintiff and the constant 
speed of defendant's car at 35 miles per hour (the lowest 
speed attributable to defendant, except for his own 
testimony) he concluded that plaintiff preceded de-
fendant into the intersection by .15 seconds and was 
8 feet into the intersection when defendant entered the 
intersection ( R. 68, 69; see P. Ex. 6) . 
Defendant's speed was a material fact and the fol-
lowing witnesses testified as follows: 
1. Defendant: 
Q. (by Mr. Summerhays) As you approached 
the intersection, about what speed were you 
traveling? 
A. I would say about 25 miles per hour. (R. 
164). 
2. Plaintiff: 
Q. (by Mr. Hughes) Did yo~ have an opport~­
nity to perceive or make Judgment as }.o his 
3 
(defendant's) speed as he bore down upon 
you? 
A. I would say 45 or 50 miles per hour. (R. 
159). 
3. Officer Baum: 
Q. (by Mr. Hughes) ... Did you inquire as to 
the speed of Mr. Hooper's vehicle at the time 
of the accident? 
A. As I recall, I did. 
Q. And what did he relate on that occasion, if 
you recall? 
A. Approximately 30 miles per hour. (R. 14). 
Officer Baum further testified concerning his opin-
ion of the speed of defendant's vehicle from his investi-
gation. 
Q. Now in connection with the vehicle driven 
by the defendant, Mr. Hooper, do you have a 
like opinion of the speed of his vehicle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that, sir? 
A. 35 to 40 miles per hour. 
The testimony of defendant as to his speed at the 
time of the accident can be discounted on simple mathe-
matics and his own testimony. He testified that he first 
observed plaintiff's vehicle when he was about to the 
crosswalk ( R. 165) . On cross examination he drew on 
Exhibit 6 the position of his vehicle in red and marked 
the position of plaintiff's vehicle; both were at their 
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respective crosswalks (see P. Ex. 6). Exhibit 6 clearly 
shows that from the curb line from which defendant 
entered the intersection (west) to the point of impact 
was 38 feet. If defendant was in fact proceeding at 25 
miles per hour, he would be traveling at the rate of 
36 . 6 feet per second. Had defendant not decelerated 
in any manner, he would have struck the rear of plain-
tiff's vehicle and not the left front fender and door as 
Exhibit 1 clearly shows. 
The deceleration chart of Engineer Coon on Ex-
hibit 6 clearly demonstrates that had defendant been 
traveling at the speed of 25 miles per hour with 15 feet 
of braking, he would have stopped short of colliding 
with plaintiff's vehicle by ll feet. 
With respect to the physical nature of the inter-
section as it existed at the time of the accident, the 
evidence clearly indicated that the width of 100 South 
Street was 52 feet and the width of 600 West Street 
was 51 feet (see P. Ex. 5). 
The intersection was relatively clear with no natu-
ral obstacles to obscure the vision of approaching mo-
torists. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 for the location of a 
house and bush on the southwest corner of the inter-
section which stood between the parties; however, at 
the time of the accident there was a row of parked 
vehicles on the southerly side of 100 South Street, 
closely parked up to 15 or 20 feet from the intersection 
(R. 139; see P. Ex. 5). 
Officer Baum testified plaintiff traveled 29.5 feet 
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into the intersection and defendant traveled 38 feet 
into the intersection to the point of collision (see P. 
Ex. 5 & 6, R. 21), and defendant laid down 10 feet 
of skid marks before skidding into plaintiff's car at the 
point of impact. He further testified that plaintiff's car 
was knocked 17 feet through the air before it struck 
the pavement (R. 24) which then left 19 feet of skid 
marks to its point of final rest. Defendant's vehicle 
after impact, left 47 feet of skid marks, or a total of 57 
feet of skid marks prior to its final point of rest (R. 
33). After the collision the vehicles came to rest side 
by side with their front ends facing the northeast corner 
of the intersection and their sides so closely together 
that their doors could not be opened (R. 166, 168). 
Engineer Coon testified that from the physical 
measurements of Officer Baum, he determined the fol-
lowing: 
Q. (by Mr. Hughes) Mr. Coon, having assumed 
the speeds, and course of the two vehicles, 
then from your background, can you antici-
pate, and can you relate what final course 
or what path these vehicles took and came to 
rest? 
Mrs. Summerhays: That question can be an-
swered yes or no, Your Honor. 
A. Yes, I believe I can. 
Q. (by .Mr. Hughes) Now, would you relate 
for us what that would be? 
A. Yes, sir. Again assuming a 35 miles speed 
for the eastbound vehicle, hitting a vehicle 
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broadside going northbound, you lose a cer-
tain amount of the speed with the applica-
tion of brakes with the vehicle going 35 miles 
an hour. This would be composed of two 
parts. One would be the slowing down as the 
brakes were applied prior to the wheels lock-
ing causing skid marks. Then there would 
be a further slowdown as the wheels locked 
and the automobile skidded. I have made a 
deceleration chart based upon this, and there 
would be approximately 5 miles per hour of 
the 35-mile an hour speed, which would be 
lost due to brakage. So that at the time of 
impact, I would estimate the speed of the 
eastbound vehicle as going from 35 miles an 
hour to 30 miles an hour. 
Q. Would you be good enough to make that 
notation at the top of your Exhibit? 
A. (Indicated) (Witness, in blue ink, made no-
tation at the top of Exhibit 6). 
Q. Would you indicate that as car No. 2? 
A. 30 miles per hour at impact, car No. 2. Now, 
since there was no evidence in our situation, 
that we are assuming of having been brakes 
applied on vehicle No. I, we would then as-
sume it has been traveling at 20 miles per 
hour, and was still traveling at 20 miles per 
hour at the time of impact. Then, as vehicle 
No. 2 would hit vehicle No. I, it would have 
an additional slowdown. This, of course, is 
made manifest in the energy that has been 
dissipated in the bending of the respective 
automobiles. So there would be in the neigh-
borhood of 15 miles per hour of the speed of 
vehicle No. 2 that would be absorbed at im-
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pact. Because of the angle at which the two 
cars hit, it would be quite likely that vehicle 
No. 1 would also lose some of its speed, and 
at the time of braking away from the impact, 
both vehicles were approximately 15 miles 
per hour, and going at the same speed, and 
peeling out of the collision position, they 
would come to rest essentially at the same 
point, side by side, as indicated by the dotted 
line over here (indicated )-Ex. 6.) So from 
a point, immediately after impact, both cars 
would have a speed of approximately 15 
miles per hour, and would then come to their. 
final resting position, decelerating from that 
speed. 
The testimony in the case as to what plaintiff did 
1s not contradictory, and his actions are brought out 
most favorably to defendant in the cross examination 
by his counsel. 
By Mr. Lawrence L. Summerhays: 
Q. Going back to the accident, Mr. Hughes, 
you stated that you were traveling north on 
Sixth West, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were in an 1951 Ford? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this had a stick shift, did it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now during the block immediately preceding 
the place where the accident occurred, what 
would you say your maximum speed would 
have been? 
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A. Probably 20 miles an hour. 
Q. Could you have gotten up to 25? 
A. It is possible. 
Q. Had you checked your speedometer, ac-
tually? 
A. No, I had not gone far, only a block, sir, 
they are short in Provo. I ha2. just started 
out. 
Q. Is that the reason you say that you could not 
have gotten your speed up to over 25? 
A. If you gun out, you probably could, but that 
is not my usual way of driving. 
Q. I say, that is the reason then you say not over 
25, because of the distance that you had trav-
eled? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now the first time you saw the Hooper ve-
hicle, it was already in the intersection, was 
it not? 
A. No, I would say it was about 15 feet-
Q. Fifteen feet from you and in the intersec-
tion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then was that the first time you looked, to 
see if you could see the car? 
A. No, I had looked on the previous intersec-
tion, and again at this intersection? 
Q. Where was your car when you first looked 
to the west, to see if there were any cars com-
ing from the west toward the east? 
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A. Probably somewhere before the intersection. 
Q. How far before? 
A. I could not say, it's been too long ago, and 
I can't remember. 
Q. Would it have been further than 15 or 20 
feet before? 
A. Probably not. 
Q. Okay then, from a point 15 to 20 feet before 
the intersection, you could see the full length 
of the block, could you not? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. How far could you see? 
A. There were several cars parked there, and 
I know you have driven as you approach an 
intersection, where cars are parked near the 
intersection itself, it is ofttimes hard to see 
cars coming along. I noticed there were cars 
there, as I approached that. 
Q. Now except for the cars that you say were 
parked there, from the point 15 or 20 feet 
from the intersection, you could have seen 
the full length of the block, could you not? 
A. Might have. 
Q. How far is this house, the side of the house 
from the street (in di ca ted) ? 
A. I don't know, I imagine 30 feet. 
Q. If you were only 15 feet, certainly the house 
would not block you, you could look all the 
way down, could you not? 
A. Not if the cars were parked there. 
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Q. I said absent the cars. 
A. If the cars were not there, yes. 
Q. Yes, now you say that there were some cars 
there, how close were the cars to the west side 
of the intersection? 
A. I would say right up to the legal limit, or 
closer. 
Q. And that would be what, about 30 feet? 
A. I imagine yes. 
Q. You knew then, that those cars constituted 
a hazard to your vision, did you not? 
A. I didn't have much time to analyze it. It was 
only a matter of a split second or two. 
Q. Yes, but as you approached the intersection, 
you could see that the cars were parked along 
the intersection, could you not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you knew that they would constitute a 
hazard to your view, did you not? 
A. Maybe, I don't think you make that kind of 
an analysis every time you come to a corner, 
to analyze the situation. 
Q. You mean you didn't, is this correct? 
A. I think I took all the usual care and caution 
in approaching the intersection, if that is 
what you mean. 
Q. You knew if there was a car coming into the 
intersection, and hidden behind those cars, 
that you were not able to see, there might be 
an accident, did you not? 
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A. I didn't know there was a car coming, no. 
Q. You didn't know one way or another, whether 
there was, did you? 
A. No, I would not know. 
Q. Now you say there was not much time from 
15 or 20 feet back, to determine whether or 
not there was a car there, is this correct? 
A. It would only be a matter of a split second. 
Q. Fraction of a second? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Under those circumstances, didn't you feel , 
at the time that you should drive more slowly, 
so that you could make sure that the way was 
free before you got into the path of any car 
that might be coming? 
A. I would feel that I was making or taking 
the necessary precautions. I had slowed to 
15 or 20 miles. I had to shift, I was going so 
slow I remember I had to shift gears. As you 
know, on a stick shift, if you don't shift down, 
you begin to stall out. Before I finished shift-
ing, I was hit. 
Q. When you saw the car, it was too late to do 
anything? 
A. That is right. 
12 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT AND THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUS-
TAINED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND THE 
LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING 
THE QUESTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFEND-
ANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AS 
SET FORTH IN PAGE 49 OF THE RECORD, 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3. 
POINT III 
A MOTORIST, ENTERING THE INTER-
SECTION FIRST AND HAVING THE RIGHT 
OF WAY BY REASON OF BEING TO THE 
RIGHT OF ANOTHER APPROACHING VE-
HICLE TO AN INTERSECTION, HAS THE 
RIGHT TO EXPECT, IN ABSENCE OF NO-
TICE TO THE CONTRARY, THAT THE 
OTHER MOTORIST WILL HEED THE 
TRAFFIC LAWS. 
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POINT IV 
DEFENDANT HAD THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF TO SHOW CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE 
WAS AN APPROXIMATE CONTRIBUTORY 
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURY, UN-
LESS PLAINTIFF'S PROOF ESTABLISHED 
CLEARLY SUCH A PRESUMPTION OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE VERDICT AND THE JUDGMENT 
OF THE LOWER COURT ARE NOT SUS- 1 
TAINED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND THE 
LOWER COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING 
THE QUESTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY. 
The jury found there was substantial evidence of 
negligence on the part of the defendant for in their 
verdict they stated: 
"We, the Jury impanelled ii:t the above entitled 
cause, find the issues in favor of the defendant 
and against the plaintiff, no cause of action. 
Isl Barbara Jolley 
Isl John L. Carpenter 
Isl Rulon Finch 
Isl Richard L. Hutchins 
Isl Bert S. J asperson 
Isl Carl A. Pack 
14 
We above are fallowing proposition No. 5. 
We feel that from the evidence given that the 
plaintiff was negligent in the operation of his 
car, by not keeping a proper lookout. Therefore 
plaintiff cannot recover. 
Date April 26, 1966. 
Is/ Arthur D. Adams 
Foreman" 
The jury found negligence on the part of the 
defendant; otherwise, they would have found against 
the plaintiff under Instruction No. 4, the trial court's 
general negligence interrogatory. 
It is elementary that evidence which makes the 
question of negligence a matter of mere surmise, con-
jecture, or speculation, or which gives rise merely to 
the possibility of negligence, does not justify submis-
sion of the case to the jury. See 38 Am. Jur., N egli-
,qence, Section 322, P. 1031; 20 Am. Jur., Negligence, 
Section 253, P. ll41. Furthermore, a case should not 
be left to the jury if the evidence is as consistent with 
the absence of negligence as with its existence. See 65 
C.J.S.S ec 25 3, P. ll 41, 43footnote 57, for authorities 
so holding. 
The trial court submitted the following interroga-
tory to the jury in Instruction No. 5, which was an-
swered affirmatively by the jury as set forth above, 
namely: 
Instruction No. 5 
Even though you find the propositions set forth 
in the next preceding instruction in favor of the 
15 
plaintiff, nevertheless, the claim of the plaintiff 
may be barred by contributory negligence on his 
1 
part. 
Before contributory negligence would preclude 
plaintiff's recovery, the defendant has the bur-
den of proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the two propositions are true: 
Proposition No. I 
That the plaintiff was.negligent in the opera-
tion of his automobile immediately prior to the 
collision in one or more of the following par-
ticulars: 
(a) In failing to yield the right of way to the 
defendant. 
(b) In failing to keep a proper lookout for 
other vehicles and particularly the vehicle of the 
defendant. 
( c) In traveling too fast for the existing con-
ditions ... 
An examination of the record fails to disclose any 
evidence whatsoever upon which the Court was justified 
in submitting the above interrogatory or any part there-
of to the jury. 
Let us consider the contention of the jury that 
plaintiff was not maintaining a proper lookout. 
In substance, plaintiff testified he traveled about 
a block and one half before coming to the intersection at 
which time he looked both to the left and to the right, 
and that as he approached 100 South Street, he slowed 
16 
so as to necessitate shifting from high to second gear, 
a speed of about 15 miles per hour. Further, he looked 
to his left and right, and the intersection appeared clear 
of all vehicular traffic; however, there was a row of 
closely parked cars to his left obstructing his vision. 
These cars were parked within 30 feet of the inter-
section. 
Plaintiff first observed defendant bearing down 
on him when he was in the intersection and defendant 
was about 15 feet away. 
It is clear that plaintiff had done all that is re-
quired of a reasonably prudent man under the circum-
stances, i.e., to proceed into the intersection at a rea-
sonable speed under the circumstances keeping a proper 
lookout for all vehicular traffic. 
Plaintiff had the right to assume that traffic would 
heed the traffic laws of Utah and the Provo City Ordi-
nances as to speed an~ not enter the intersection at a 
rate of speed which would make likely a collision with 
his car. 
Defendant violated Section 41-6-72 UCA in fail-
ing to yield the right of way to a vehicle on his left 
and which entered the intersection first; likewise, he 
violated the Provo City Ordinance which restricted 
speed to 25 miles per hour. 
Plaintiff should not be adjudged negligent for 
committing himself to the intersection at 15-20 miles 
per hour for he had right to assume that no vehicle 
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would be coming to the left at a speed in excess of 25 
miles per hour. See Jones v. Williams, 358 Pa. 559, 58 
A 2d 57. 
The reasonableness of plaintiff's right to rely that 
others will use the highway lawfully and not speed is 
best shown by demonstrating the accident would not 
have occurred if the defendant had been traveling 25 
miles per hour as he said he was and complied with 
the traffic ordinances of Provo City. 
The "Deceleration Curve" on part of P. Ex. 6 
is mathematically conclusive on this point. The horizon-
tal distance scale demonstrates that defendant, travel-
ing at 35 miles per hour, braking as he did, would bring 
his vehicle to rest after traveling 55 feet. Thus defend-
ant's speed was zero at 55 feet. By working backward 
on the normal braking curve, as indicated,1 defendant 
would have traveled 27 feet, had he actually been going 
2A5 miles per hour, the maximum speed permitted. The 
defendant's testimony that he was traveling 25 
miles per hour is controverted by the phys icar · 
facts of the accident. It is the general rule , 
and the rule of this State, that testimony which 
is contrary to uncontroverted physical facts , 
does not constitute substantial evidence. H..aar.-
strich v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 70 U. 55 2, 
262, P. 101.20 AM. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 1183 
32 C .J .S., Evidence, Sec. 103l(c). 
1 This scale and normal braking curve at 25 miles per hour are 
added for clarity of argument. 
18 
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1 This scale and normal braking curve at 25 miles per hour are 
added for clarity of argument. 
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Defendant, under his own testimony, had at least 
38 feet from the time he first observed plaintiff within 
which to stop. Defendant would have stopped short of 
colliding into plaintiff's vehicle by 11 feet. 
The requirement that two essential elements in 
contributory negligence exist, namely: (I) Negligence 
for which plaintiff is responsible; and (2) causal con-
nection between such negligence and the injury com-
plained of are not supported in the record. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFEND-
ANT IN ACCORDANCE WI 'l' H PLAIN-
TIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS AS 
SET FORTH IN PAGE 49 OF THE RECORD, 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3. 
Plaintiff incorporates herein the arguments set 
forth under Point I and for the reasons therein set 
forth urges this Court to set aside the verdict and judg-
ment of the lower court and order said court to grant 
the plaintiff a new trial solely for the purpose of ascer-
taining the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff, 
and that the lower court enter judgment for plaintiff 
in accordance with such findings. 
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POINT III 
A MOTORIST, ENTERING THE INTER-
SECTION FIRST AND HAVING THE RIGHT 
OF WAY BY REASON OF BEING TO THE 
RIGHT OF ANOTHER APPROACHING VE-
HICLE TO AN INTERSECTION, HAS THE 
RIGHT TO EXPECT, IN ABSENCE OF NO-
TICE TO THE CONTRARY, THAT THE 
OTHER MOTORIST WILL HEED THE 
TRAFFIC LAWS. 
Plaintiff in approaching 100 South Street looked 
to the right and to the left. His view was obscured to 
the left by reason of closely parked vehicles along the 
southerly curve line of that street. So far as plaintiff 
approaching the subject intersection, he had the right 
of way by reason of being to the right of any traffic 
approaching from the west, and he had the right to 
assume that a motorist approaching from the west 
would observe the traffic laws. See Hogg. v. Muir, 
383 P. 413; 119 A.2d 53, 59 ALR 2d 1197. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT HAD THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF TO SHOW CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE 
w·As AN APPROXIMATE CONTRIBUTORY 
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURY, UN-
LESS PLAINTIFF'S PROOF ESTABLISHED 
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CLEARLY SUCH A PRESUMPTION OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. 
Plaintiff in proceeding north on 600 West Street, 
drove with circumspection and well within the posted 
speed limit. The only thing he could have done more 
than he did was to come to a complete stop at the inter-
section of 100 South Street. The law does not impose 
this burden upon a motorist who approaches an open 
intersection and has the right of way. The negligence 
of defendant is apparent and such negligence was the 
proximate cause of the accident. Defendant cannot 
seriously contend to the contrary but hopes to avoid 
liability on the ground that plaintiff was contributorily 
negligent which proximately contributed to the collision 
and to the damages sustained. The burden of proof of 
an affirmative defense of contributory negligence is the 
party pleading such defense. 
See Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Sec. 2507, 
Bell v. Carlson, 270 P. 2nd 420, Bryan v. Hill, 45 
Idaho 662, 264 P. 869. Defendant adduced no evidence 
supporting his affirmative defense. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the undisputed evidence in this case, the 
duty imposed upon the plaintiff driver by the trial court 
was such as required of him a standard care which would 
preclude his involvement in a moving automobile acci-
dent at any open intersection, regardless of whether he 
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entered the intersection first, whether he had the right 
of way, or whether or not the other driver was speed-
ing. The contributory negligence interrogatory, In-
struction No. 5, allowing the jury to speculate upon the 
evidence, which was clearly more consistent with the 
absence of plaintiff's negligence than with its existence. 
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT W. HUGHES 
Attorney for Appellant and 
Plaintiff 
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